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Governmentality and EU democracy promotion: The European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and the construction of 
democratic civil societies 
 
Milja Kurki 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Democracy promotion has become an important ‘symbolic’ facet of European Union’s (EU) 
foreign and development policy and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR) is often considered, despite its moderate budget, the ‘jewel in the crown’ of 
the EU’s democracy promotion. The EIDHR’s (reformed) mandate, crucially, encompasses 
the funding of democratising civil society organisations and thus the facilitation of the 
emergence of democratic publics ‘from below’. But what are we to make of EU’s ‘soft edge’ 
democracy promotion through civil society support? It is argued here that if we apply 
Foucauldian governmentality tools to the analysis of the workings of the EIDHR we can see 
that, despite the pluralistic rhetoric that guides it, the Instrument’s objectives and 
management structures facilitate very particular kinds of democratic visions and democratic 
actors. Neoliberal governmentality is, it is argued, hidden deep within the expectations set for 
EU-funded civil society ‘democratisers’. This has important consequences for how we 
understand the model of democracy that the EU promotes and the power relations of the EU’s 
‘locally owned’ democracy promotion. 
 
Key words: governmentality, democracy promotion, civil society support, European Union, 
neoliberalism 
 
Introduction 
 
Work with, for and through civil society organisations will give the response strategy [of 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights] its critical profile. It will, on 
the one hand, promote the kind of open society, which civil society requires in order to 
thrive, and on the other hand, will support civil society in becoming an effective force 
for dialogue and reform relying on the role of men, women and children as individuals 
with the power, capacity and will to create development (EC, 2006: 5). 
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Coinciding with the push for a new model of active European citizenship within the borders 
of the expanded Union (Hager, 2009: 115), the European Union’s external policies too have 
turned to the facilitation of the emergence of self-sufficient, innovative, critical, and 
entrepreneurial citizens and civil society organisations in the Union’s ‘neighbourhood’ and 
‘third countries’. Indeed, the EU democracy promotion system has seen an important shift in 
the last few years: while previous attempts at democracy promotion focused firmly on 
facilitating the functioning of the democratic state, its rule of law structures, and its 
institutional bases, recent drives among democracy promoters have involved a focus on 
fostering the right kind of democratic culture ‘from below’ (Youngs, 2001, 2003; see also e.g. 
Diamond, 1999; Burnell, 2000). But what are we to make of the EU’s new ‘soft edge’ 
democracy promotion strategy involving civil society support? Does it entail, as democracy 
promoters often contend, locally sensitive and locally owned processes of democracy 
facilitation and, if so, with what consequences for EU democracy promotion?  
 
This piece seeks to analyse the EU’s civil society-focused democracy promotion tools, 
notably the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. Rather unconventionally 
vis a vis the dominant literature on democracy promotion, the analysis here takes at its 
starting point the insights of Michel Foucault with regard to the nature of liberal governance 
in late 20
th
 century societies. I seek to place Foucault’s reflections on governmentality in 
advanced liberal societies within the context of the EU’s civil society-focused democracy 
promotion strategy. This is a somewhat unusual exercise, for democracy promotion, let alone 
EU foreign policy, has been rarely analysed from a Foucauldian perspective. This is despite 
the proliferation of ‘governmentality analyses’ in the study of international relations more 
generally (see e.g. Dillon and Reid, 2001; Duffield, 2007; Dean and Henman, 2004; Kiersey, 
2009; Sending and Neumann, 2006; Abrahamsen, 2004) and of critical politico-economic 
analysis of the European Union more widely (see e.g. Apeldoorn et al, 2009; Bieler and 
Morton, 2001). It is argued here that considering a Foucauldian perspective in interrogating 
the practices of democracy promotion is a fruitful exercise – even for those who tend to be 
sceptical of poststructuralist theoretical perspectives in the study of politics. This is because a 
Foucauldian perspective, despite its imprecisions and limitations, provides an innovative 
angle into the analysis of democracy promotion techniques, its power-dimensions, and its 
politico-economic foundations.  
 
The analysis here is based on an engagement with Foucault’s late works on liberal 
governmentality. In The Birth of Biopolitics (2008 [1979]) Foucault reflected on the role of 
economic rationalities of a specific liberal kind in facilitating the functioning of 
‘governmentality’ in late modern society. He argued that since the 1930s, and somewhat 
more intensively since the 1950s, there has been a decisive, although often missed, move 
away from both ‘social welfare liberalism’ and ‘classical liberalism’ as the guiding principles 
of government towards the development of ‘neoliberal’ logics of governmentality. For 
Foucault, the practices of neoliberal governmentality do not aim to centralise power, facilitate 
negative freedom, or complete ‘redistributional’ projects in society. Rather, they foreground 
specific kinds of liberal economic rationalities and interventions as essential in fostering 
‘free’ and ‘prosperous’ liberal democratic society. This article examines the extent to which 
such rationalities, and the governmental techniques they are linked to, may be present in 
contemporary democracy promotion as practiced by the EU. 
 
What precipitates an interest in such an analysis? First, it is precipitated by Foucault’s claim 
that neoliberal governmentality logics present themselves in very interesting ways in the 
European context, where they are embedded within the societal and discursive logics of these 
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advanced liberal states, albeit in unique forms (Foucault, 2008; see also Apeldoorn, 2009). 
Given this claim, it is interesting to ask: what is the role of the European Union, and its policy 
programmes in facilitating, reflecting, or advancing neoliberal governmentality?  
 
Many studies on neoliberal governance have been conducted in recent years. A number of 
critical political economists, for example, have identified shifts in the direction of neoliberal 
ideals within the European Union’s governance structures (see e.g. Ryner, 2002; Apeldoorn, 
2009; Bieler and Morton, 2001). While these neo-Gramscians identify the source of 
neoliberal logics among specific groups of people within the EU, for example, among 
transnational capitalist elites (see e.g. Apeldoorn, 2009), the Foucauldian perspective points 
us in a somewhat different direction. It is, for better or for worse, less focused on identifying 
specific sources of power and elites in charge of ideological projects, and more interested in 
the analysis of diffuse forms of governmental rationalities. Such a perspective provides an 
interesting addition to the existing literature on neoliberal logics in EU governance, which 
often, somewhat problematically it would seem, assumes the existence of coherent 
ideological elites.  
 
Second, and more importantly, this paper is driven by the impetus to understand the curious 
nature of EU democracy promotion. The EU has become an important democracy promotion 
actor; yet, its approach to democracy promotion is uniquely complex as well as uniquely 
vague and ‘non-ideological’ in nature. To avoid opening up divisive contestation between EU 
actors and member states over what kind of democracy should be promoted by the EU, 
questions of normative, political and ideological nature are typically avoided in EU 
democracy promotion in favour of programmatic and technical forms of discussion. The EU 
has sought to depoliticise its democracy promotion. This does not mean that hidden political 
logics are not present, however. Foucault’s analytical starting point is one way of digging 
deeper into the kinds of logics or hidden rationalities that might be embedded within EU 
democracy promotion, despite its non-political non-ideological veneer.  
 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, this piece is driven by the wish to understand better the 
EU’s new civil society instrument, the EIDHR. This funding instrument has been hailed as 
the new tool through which the EU can encourage democracy from a ‘bottom-up’ 
perspective, rather than relying on forms of coercion and incentivisation at the level of state 
elites and high diplomacy. In this sense, the EIDHR’s funding is often perceived as the tool 
that has ensured that there is a uniquely ‘soft edge’ to EU democracy promotion, one that 
takes account of cultural and local sensitivities in target states and one that actively prioritises 
the wishes of civil society organisations and target populations over those of the EU 
administration or dominant member states. What is interesting about a Foucauldian 
perspective is that it provides an angle that forces us to probe further the claim that civil 
society promotion is locally sensitive, non-interfering or non-coercive in nature. 
Governmentality techniques, if present in the EIDHR practices, would entail quite a different 
reading of the role of the EU’s civil society-focused democracy promotion. Creation of 
particular kinds of ‘free individuals’ and a ‘productive and active’ democratic civil society 
would be seen, not as simply an unbiased facilitation of freedom, but as, potentially, a deep-
running form of governmental control over the nature of individuals, society and governance 
in target states. 
 
It is argued here that indications exist to the effect that neoliberal economic rationalities and 
governmentality techniques may indeed be present in EU democracy promotion through the 
EIDHR. Specifically, indications of their existence are identified in the logic of the EIDHR’s 
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objectives, calls for proposals and management structures. Just how ‘successful’ these logics 
are in shaping the civil society actors and target publics remains an open question that I 
cannot claim to holistically answer here. Indeed, this piece is not focused on evaluating the 
impact of governmentality practices in target states, civil society organisations, or target 
publics, but rather on their manifestations in the EIDHR’s strategy and management 
structures (cf. Hager’s approach to neoliberalism in citizenship approaches of the EU, 2009 
or Abrahamsen, 2004). While this analysis is but a first step in getting to grips with the 
workings of governmentality in the EIDHR, the rationalities and governance techniques 
noted here seem to suggest that more attention needs to be paid to the possibility that specific 
assumptions about the nature of civil society actors and their expected ‘freedom-facilitating’ 
activities are being made in EU democracy promotion, with important consequences for how 
we should perceive civil society ‘ownership’ of EIDHR projects and the power relations of 
EU democracy promotion more widely. Specific kinds of entrepreneurial individuals and 
organisations, it seems, are ‘called forth’ through the EIDHR’s calls for proposals and 
facilitated through its management structures with deep consequences for how the economy, 
democratic culture and the functions of civil society vis a vis the state are perceived.  
 
The article is divided into three sections. The first sets out a Foucauldian framework for the 
analysis of neoliberal governance. The second section sets out the core aspects of EU’s 
democracy promotion and the role of the EIDHR within it, highlighting the rationale for an 
investigation of these practices from a Foucualdian perspective. Section three then conducts 
an analysis of the EIDHR’s democracy promotion by examining in detail some of its core 
strategy documents, calls for proposals, and management structure. The final section seeks to 
draw some conclusions about the consequences of neoliberal governmentality in the EU’s 
democracy promotion as well as the future challenges posed for governmentality analysis. 
 
 
Foucault and liberal governmentality 
 
Foucault developed his reflections on governmentality and biopower in a series of lectures to 
College de France in 1978 and 1979 (Foucault, 2008). These have only been recently 
published, and as many commentators have noted, constituted still very much work in 
progress (Joseph, 2009). It follows that there is a significant degree of vagueness to the 
concept of governmentality. But what should we, broadly, understand by the idea of 
governmentality? The most common definition utilised in the literature identifies 
governmentality as the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Weidner, 2009: 389). Governmentality is a 
notion that refers to the workings of power outside the sphere of formalised or centralised 
material sites of power: governmentality refers to forms of power on the micro-level. It is the 
life of the population or individuals that is the target of governmentality; governmentality is, 
as Joseph has noted, ‘power at a distance’ but nevertheless influential on thoughts, desires, 
bodies and actions.  Governmentality involves, for Foucault, ‘a question not of imposing laws 
on men, but of disposing things’ (Foucault, quoted in Sending and Neumann, 2006: 656). The 
governmental form of power is not, however, exclusive of other types of power, and is 
intimately tied to coercive and disciplinary forms of power (Joseph, 2009; Sending and 
Neumann, 2006).  
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But how does governmentality, or biopolitics
1
, within liberal governance function? In The 
Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault was particularly interested in the functions of new forms of 
‘governance of life’ that governmentality started to involve in the mid- to late 20th century. 
He was particularly interested in what he called a neoliberal governmentality. This referred to 
a form of governmentality which was focused on governing through the idea of freedom. 
Neoliberal governmentality, for Foucault, is a particular type of liberal technique of control 
that has as its aim the utilisation of the principle of freedom as a mode of moulding the 
individual and society.  
 
One way to gain a better sense of what neoliberal governmentality meant for Foucault is to 
understand its meaning in relation to classical liberalism. Classical liberals understood the 
individual as a rational agent and the aim of the state, law and society to facilitate their 
freedom from external constraints (which would compromise their freedom to exercise their 
rational faculties). Yet, classical liberalism no longer sets the terms of the debate, Foucault 
argues (2008). Classical liberalism is a misleading framework for understanding late 20
th
 
century society and economics, for Foucault, for since the 1930s and 1950s the central 
notions of liberalism have, in fact, stressed the importance of governing and producing free 
subjects of a particular kind, not simply on providing them with a space to exercise their 
‘freedom’.  
 
Liberal discourse presents [the societal] realm as based on the rational conduct of 
individuals free from state interference. However, this freedom and liberty is clearly a 
construction that is reinforced through a particular set of social practices and a normative 
discourse (Joseph 2009: 416). 
 
What is central for neoliberalism, Foucault argues, is that in order to be free, the subject has 
to be ‘guided and moulded’ to conform to a particular kind of vision of free and prosperous 
individual (Dean in Joseph, 2009: 416).  
 
Crucially the liberal economy – the market competition within it – become the key reference 
points for moulding the kind of freedom that is envisaged. As Barry Hindess (2004) points 
out, the market ‘epitomizes’ the liberal view of society as ‘self-regulating’ and individuals as 
‘autonomous, self-directing’. Yet, economic rationality of a very specific kind is seen as 
central to the generation of the active exercise of freedom of the individual. In the advanced 
liberal society, Foucault argues, neoliberal governmentality seeks to mould into existence an 
‘enterprise society’ and ‘entrepreneurial individuals’ who take the market, and specifically 
the competitive functions of the market, as their guiding principle in thought, desire, and 
action. Neoliberal governmentality then is about the extension of the market vision of 
competition throughout the society, not just in the sphere of the economy. It involves the 
encouragement of the right ways of being free and rational: competition within the market is 
the ideal that actively moulds the self-understanding, the desires, and the actions of the ‘free’ 
individual. Thus, through neoliberal governmentality logic any aspect of societal life – from 
marriage to crime – can be interpreted as sites for ‘rational calculation’ by the free individual: 
while marriage can be seen as a form of a rational contract between individuals with specific 
kinds of human capital, crime is an action which puts an individual, and his productivity, at 
risk of punishment. Neoliberal governmentality refers then to the expansion of the market 
                                                          
1
 Biopower is a notion often applied in relation to governmentality. This notion it seems, refers to a sub-section 
of governmentality techniques: forms of intervention in social life that specifically focus on governance of life: 
governance of ‘wealth and health’ of liberal subjects. 
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logic to all spheres of social life and its ‘mainstreaming’ into the psychology and social 
interactions of subjects. 
 
Liberal governmentality, Foucault also notes, means devolving powers away from the state to 
the people. Rather than the ‘state’ disciplining subjects in physical and material ways, 
governmentality allows us to access the ways in which people regulate themselves and others 
in the societal sphere. While the state can tap into the micro-level forms of governmentality, 
neoliberal governmentality is not reducible to government’s objectives or intentions, but in 
fact involves the decentralisation of power to individuals. Indeed, a key aspect of neoliberal 
governance, argues Foucault, is the emphasis on the local ownership of the processes of 
decision-making. This entails the prioritisation of indigenous decision-makers, specialists or 
indeed civil society organisations in ‘governance’. This makes it appear as if power is 
devolved and that control over lives is exercised by the people, not by the state or other 
authorities. Yet, Foucault’s framework seeks to show that local ownership is itself an idea 
that is framed within a governmental rationality: while it encourages responsibility-taking by 
the individual and subjects, it also forces upon them a fierce form of self-regulation with 
regard to what constitutes the right kind of a rational and responsible action. 
 
In reading Foucault on (neo)liberal governmentality, I take him to highlight four core 
analytical claims/assumptions, which will be of interest in our analysis of democracy 
promotion and its politico-economic underpinnings. 
 
1) Foucault offers us a discursive perspective on the political but also, crucially, on ‘the 
economy’. The economy is analysed as a set of practices, and as a rationality given 
rise to by practices, not as an ‘objective science’. Economic science and economic 
rationality then are denaturalised and seen as contingently produced spheres, forms of 
knowledge and sets of practices. It follows that the economic is seen as a sphere that 
is intricately tied to other spheres or disciplines: social, political, anthropological, and 
psychological. It is no longer an independent sphere exclusive of social and political 
life but deeply embedded within societal logics in a holistic sense. One of the key 
aspects of neoliberal governmentality for Foucault is that it embeds economic 
rationality into all spheres of society, not just the economic. This view challenges the 
classical liberal understanding of the economic sphere as ‘natural’ and as 
‘independent’ of the social and the political. Contrary to classical liberalism, Foucault 
sees economic rationality as a crucial aspect in the production of the meaning of the 
social and the political. ‘The economy produces political signs that enable the 
structures, mechanisms and justifications of power to function. The free market, the 
economically free market, binds and manifests political bonds’ (Foucault, 2008: 85).  
 
2) In neoliberal governmentality logics, the economic market rationality is actively 
productive of individuals, politics and governmentality of the state. The economy is 
no longer the ‘natural economy’ but rather involves the active creation of an 
(unnatural) state of ‘perfect’ competition through active intervention. The paradox of 
the liberal state for Foucault always was that it has to be justified, but on ‘minimal’ 
grounds. Neoliberal governmentality is a particular way of trying to resolve/dissolve 
this dilemma. The liberal economy is not about freedom anymore but about the active 
production of the use of freedom. ‘We have then the conditions for the creation of a 
formidable body of legislation and an incredible range of governmental interventions 
to guarantee production of the freedom needed to govern’ (Foucault, 2008: 65). 
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Economic freedom, and freedom in general, necessitates active and deep-running 
interventions in society. 
 
3) The key mode of production of the ‘free’ individual is through the creation of the 
‘entrepreneurial’ self. The entrepreneurial agent sees his or her role as not simply 
exercise of freedom but as a productive exercise of freedom. Man is now (in 
American neoliberalism especially) seen as a form of human capital. ‘This is not a 
conception of labor power: it is a conception of capital ability, which…receives a 
certain income that is a wage…so that the worker himself appears as a sort of an 
enterprise for himself (Foucault, 2008: 225). Because it is not a worker’s labour 
power but his skills (that cannot be separated from his constitution) that is the origin 
of human capital, we see men not as classical homo oeconomicus ‘in exchange’ but as 
homo oeconomicus in all spheres of social life (Foucault, 2008: 226).  
 
4) Civil society is seen as something fundamentally tied to the production of liberal 
governmentality and economic rationality. Instead of being seen as separate from the 
state or governmentality, the neoliberal civil society is seen as a sphere that is ideally 
suited to fostering the homo oeconomicus in all spheres of social life, and also a 
sphere where state power is mediated (see e.g. Sending and Neumann, 2006). Civil 
society becomes a sphere for co-opting and shaping of the right kind of rational 
conduct. Indeed, ‘civil society is…a concept of governmental technology’ (Foucault, 
2008: 296), and it is the homo oeconomicus that inhabits the civil society: ‘civil 
society is the concrete ensemble within which these ideal points, economic men, must 
be placed, so that they can be appropriately managed’ (Foucault: 2008, 296). 
 
But how do these sorts of insights direct our analysis of democracy promotion of the EIDHR?  
 
 
The EIDHR as a potential site for a Foucauldian analysis 
 
Democracy promotion has emerged as a major theme in international political practice during 
the last two decades and, it follows, has gained increasing attention in the analysis of 
international affairs (see e.g. Burnell, 2000; Carothers, 2004; Diamond, 2008; McFaul, 2010; 
Burnell and Youngs, 2009; Texeira, 2009; Barany and Moser, 2009). Although much has 
been written about the US democracy promotion efforts, it should also be noted that the EU 
has emerged as a significant democracy promotion agent in recent years. Democracy 
promotion has been advanced as an important new symbolic policy agenda for 21
st
 century 
EU foreign policy.  
 
In line with the profile rise of this policy agenda, manifold analyses of EU democracy 
promotion have been conducted in recent years (see e.g. Youngs, 2001, 2003, 2009; Barbe 
and Johanssen, 2008; Hyde-Price, 2008; Schimmelfennig, 2006). Many of these analyses 
focus on investigating whether the EU is a genuinely ‘normative’ actor or whether it applies 
realist self-interested principles to its democracy promotion activities. The assessments come 
to various conclusions, many of the analyses agreeing that the EU is both a normative and a 
realist actor (see e.g. Barbe and Johanssen, 2008). These kinds of evaluations are interesting, 
yet they are not exhaustive of the manifold theoretical and empirical insights that could be 
gained of EU democracy promotion, its role in EU foreign policy, and in relation to the target 
states. Indeed, the complex EU democracy promotion scene remains rather rarely, and rather 
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poorly, theoretically conceptualised. So remains, arguably, the role of its most innovative 
civil society support instrument, the EIDHR. 
 
 
What is the EIDHR? 
 
The EIDHR, a thematic funding instrument embedded within EuropeAid (the implementer of 
EU’s external assistance programmes), was formulated in 2006 and is the successor to the 
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights that has functioned since 2000. It is, as 
was the Initiative, part of the EU’s agenda to move towards a more locally sensitive 
democratisation approach (see e.g. Ferrero-Waldner, 2006: 2). The EIDHR’s focus is 
explicitly on funding democratic and human rights activities within the civil society of states. 
It has, as Ferrero-Waldner highlights (2006: 5), four key benefits for target countries: it is a 
flexible instrument, it is an instrument that is rapid to adapt and respond to requirements that 
may arise, it is broad in the scope of actions funded, and it is independent of governmental 
control.  
 
The EIDHR is an instrument which overlaps and complements four other external assistance 
instruments of the EU envisaged for 2007-2013 period: the Instrument of Pre-accession 
Assistance (IPA), European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the 
Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI) and the Instrument for Stability. The EIDHR is, 
however, also distinct from these aid initiatives: it is independent in its budget line and works 
with reference to its own internal objectives. These objectives are five fold: the EIDHR aims 
at 1) enhancing respect for human rights in countries where it is most at risk; 2) strengthening 
of civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reform; 3) supporting actions on 
human rights and democracy in areas covered by EU guidelines; 4) supporting international 
and regional frameworks for protection of human rights and rile of law and 5) assisting and 
organising electoral observer missions (Rihackova, 2008).  
 
Various reforms took place in the negotiation of the EIDHR II, the framework for EIDHR’s 
current work (between 2007 and 2013). In this new framework, heavier emphasis on civil 
society support has become apparent, and various complaints made by civil society actors 
with regard to the inflexibility of EU funding streams were taken on board (see Rihackova, 
2008). The main operating system of the EIDHR is still the calls for proposals, although 
some non-calls-for-proposal-based projects have also been allowed in the EIDHR II. Grants 
are given primarily to civil society organisations and non-profit organisations, although room 
still exists for ‘traditional’ electoral observation missions (objective 5). The amounts of 
funding provided by the EIDHR are relatively small – despite the rise in overall budget to 
145.8 million Euros by 2010. This means that most of the projects funded are of limited in 
scope, both in terms of their timelines and the scale of their activities. Since 2007 the EIDHR 
has co-funded 502 projects, ‘representing a combined funding of 194.2 million euros’ (EC, 
2009: i). Of these 337 are Country/Local based support Schemes (CBSS) projects managed 
by local country delegations - a ‘manifestation of the importance that EIDHR gives to 
partnerships with local actors on the ground’ (EC, 2009: i). The EIDHR then seeks to put in 
place the core aims of EU’s (and now most development agencies’) emphasis on 
development aid that is locally owned (see EC, 2004: 4). 
 
The programmes the EIDHR funds span a wide range: from support to educational 
institutions, women’s groups, and human rights NGOs to rule of law and governance 
missions, electoral encouragement and observation missions, ICC and justice related missions 
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and organisational support, to work focused on advocacy of anti-torture policies, to dialogue 
enhancement and reconciliation work, to disability rights work, to freedom of expression and 
civil society support missions. Torture is one of the largest focal points. In target countries 
range from Congo and Uganda to Serbia and Macedonia, Ukraine and Moldova to Kazakstan, 
Kyrgystan, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Nepal to Turkey, Guatemala, Brazil and Peru, Haiti, 
Jordan. Most projects are between 12 and 24 months in length and the average funding for 
individual projects tends to be less than 100 000 Euros. Crucially, the EIDHR does not as a 
matter of course fund civil society projects in their entirety: as a rule they offer grants that 
cover up to 50% of costs of projects proposed. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the individual EIDHR projects in detail. What 
is interesting to note, however, is that it is difficult to characterise these projects 
‘ideologically’ or ‘politically’, for not only are the projects not characterised in political terms 
– and are rather adverse to explicitly political language – but also, it could be argued that 
various sets of political and ideological leanings could be seen present among them (see EC, 
2009).  
 
But why might it be interesting and important to analyse the EIDHR from a Foucauldian 
governmentality perspective? 
 
The role of civil society support in EU democracy promotion has been recognised to be 
increasingly important. Indeed, as many commentators have highlighted (Youngs, 2001; 
2009), EU democracy promotion is nowadays far from merely electoral and procedural in 
nature and it is the EIDHR that constitutes the cornerstone of EU’s civil society support: it is 
the instrument that is directly charged with the production of civil society support projects in 
target states (EC, 2006; 2008). In the academic literature on EU democracy promotion, the 
EU’s civil society support is in many ways glorified: it is seen as proof that the EU has 
moved away from procedural liberalism and narrow elitist conceptions of democracy (see e.g. 
Robinson’s critique, Robinson, 1996) towards more civil society focused and culturally 
sensitive logics of democracy promotion (Pridham, 2005; Youngs, 2009). This is seen as a 
positive development and a key aspect in defence of the EU’s unique democracy promotion 
approach (Youngs, 2003).  
 
A Foucauldian perspective, however, provides quite a different starting point for evaluating 
the shift to civil society support within EU democracy promotion, for it directs us to be rather 
more circumspect towards the view of civil society and population governance as non-
coercive and neutral. It directs us to examine with some scepticism, and in more detail, the 
practices of governance of civil society support. A circumspect perspective is not of course 
unique to a Foucauldian viewpoint. Important criticisms of civil society support (Hulme and 
Edwards, 1999; Cooke and Kothari, 2009; Ottaway and Carothers, 2000; Hearn, 2000) and 
indeed of EU’s civil society support (see e.g. Bell, 2004; Crawford, 2008) have been made 
from various empirical and theoretical starting points. Yet, Foucauldian concepts provide a 
unique angle to such earlier analyses by highlighting the implicit and in important respects 
(or at least seemingly) non-intentional rationalities that can emerge within democracy 
promotion activities. Before I move to the analysis, a few caveats with regard to the 
limitations of such an analysis are in order, however. 
 
First, it is important to note that it is not the aim here to identify a ‘global governmentality’ in 
EU democracy promotion. Jonathan Joseph (2009) has powerfully argued that the attempts to 
argue that there is a global form of governmentality ‘out there’ are problematic for we can 
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neither assume the universality of governmental practices, nor the applicability of 
governmental analysis in non-liberal settings. I agree with Joseph’s analysis and make no 
attempt to analyse or draw conclusions about global governmentality here. The focus here is 
rather narrowly on the specific formulations and techniques of governmentality in the EU 
democracy promotion framework, and specifically within the EIDHR.  
 
Second, Jonathan Joseph and others have asked whether the Foucauldian governmentality 
approach can fruitfully be applied in non-liberal contexts. This is a pertinent question, but one 
that is deliberately side-stepped here. Governmentality here is analysed in the EIDHR’s 
democracy promotion framework, not ‘on the ground’ in target states. This creates some 
limitations to this analysis (see the conclusion), yet the limited analysis advanced here is 
perceived as an important first step towards a more detailed analysis of governmentality 
within EU democracy promotion. 
 
Third, what about the role of material, coercive and disciplinary power vis a vis governmental 
power?  Joseph (2009) and Selby (2007) have argued that we should not reduce all forms of 
power to governmental power, simply because this form of power may be present. This is an 
important insight: it is important to note that with EU’s democratic conditionalities in Eastern 
Europe, Middle East and Africa, clearly coercive, material, and disciplinary forms of power 
are also involved in EU democracy promotion. Yet, this does not mean that we should not 
also analyse whether there are governmental forms of power at work. Indeed, as we will see, 
we can arguably say something new about the EU’s civil society assistance programmes 
through a governmental, rather than a more traditional power political perspective, partly 
precisely because the EIDHR’s funding does not involve hard conditionality in the same 
sense as other EU democracy promotion policies do. 
 
 
Governmentality in and through the EIDHR 
 
To elucidate what a Foucauldian analysis might reveal within the context of EU democracy 
promotion, I reflect here on a selection of sources that guide the work of the EIDHR and its 
project management systems. Notably, I analyse the objectives set out in the Strategy Paper 
that guides the EIDHR’s current work (EC, 2006), the structure of the funding calls of the 
EIDHR, and the wider project management framework within which the projects are 
managed. The analysis here does not claim to be exhaustive or final, and is clearly limited in 
not focusing on identifying the functions of governmentality in individual cases of EIDHR 
support. Nevertheless, I suggest that the EIDHR does seem to facilitate neoliberal 
governmentality functions within its objectives and through its management systems.  
 
 
Governmentality techniques: ‘disposing’ civil society of liberal entrepreneurial individuals 
 
For Foucault governmentality involved not the imposing of laws and institutions on 
individuals, but rather their ‘disposing’ in particular ways. He suspected that civil society, 
instead of being the sphere of passive freedom, actually acted as the key site for the ‘conduct 
of conduct’ of homo oeconomicus, a site where governmentality techniques functioned to 
create specific kinds of market-minded liberal individuals. But does the EIDHR funding 
‘dispose’ publics and civil society in the ways Foucault’s account might suggest, and if so, 
how? I start the analysis here by interrogating the assumptions that the EIDHR makes about 
the actors that it seeks to fund as democratisers in local contexts.  
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Governmentality in objectives 
 
The EIDHR has five core objectives. It is the first three of these objectives that are the focus 
of the analysis here. Objectives 4 and 5 relate to support for fairly classical liberal democratic 
democracy promotion measures focused on institutional support for elections and rule of law 
systems within target countries and the facilitation of international co-operation in the area of 
democracy support. These objectives, while interesting, do not centrally concern the analysis 
here. From a Foucauldian perspective the most interesting aspects of the EIDHR (EC, 2006: 
2) relate to Objectives 1, 2 and 3, which aim, respectively, to ‘enhance respect for human 
rights in countries most at risk’, ‘strengthen the role of the civil society in promoting human 
rights and democratic reform’, and to ‘support actions on human rights and democracy 
issues’.  
 
These three objectives speak in interesting ways to the Foucauldian system of analysis, for 
what is notable about them is that they equate democracy promotion not with institutional 
changes within the state or in the international context, but rather with specific changes in the 
power-relations and attitudes of target state publics. The aim of democracy promotion in 
these objectives is to intervene to effect changes in the views, mindsets and assumptions of 
target state populations and civil society organisations. The aim is specifically not to coerce 
‘the state’ through traditional diplomatic means to adopt democratic processes; rather it is to 
facilitate pressures of a democratic kind ‘from below’ through intervening in productive ways 
in the conceptions of ‘good life’ held by target populations so as to produce ‘capacity’ for 
them to challenge authoritarian practices within their home states.  
 
But what kind of civil society and individuals do the EIDHR objectives in question envisage? 
I note here six aspects that are of interest from a Foucauldian perspective.  
 
First, the civil society that is envisaged has to be such that ‘defend[s] fundamental freedoms 
which form the basis of all democratic processes’. This means civil society organisations that 
are encouraged should accept ‘fundamental freedoms’ as central to their activities and should 
actively push for political reform in their target countries on the basis of them. It is important 
to note that it is not ‘any’ type of civil society support that the EIDHR is after, but rather a 
specific kind which places fundamental freedoms at the centre of it. There is a specific vision 
of the role of democratising civil society at the heart of the EIDHR: one within which 
individuals actively fight for individual and collective freedoms of the kind specified in 
EIDHR’s guidance and EU documents on fundamental freedoms (see e.g. EC, 1995).  
 
Second, the EIDHR perceives civil society as ‘autonomous’  and ‘effective’ change-inducing 
set of actors and it is this civil society effectiveness that the EIDHR seeks to support and 
augment (EC, 2006: 2).  Crucially, the civil society organisations (CSOs) that are chosen as 
partners within the EIDHR are not just ‘any’ organisations but ones that are seen, and that see 
themselves, as active and effective change-inducers in local contexts. The CSOs are to take 
on the development and democratisation aims of the EU and for this reason must have the 
intentionality and self-belief to see themselves as crucial democratising actors. Since the EU 
must ensure that they can rely on the local actors to direct, manage and implement its external 
assistance, the CSOs too should conceive of themselves as autonomous, active and effective 
change-inducers. 
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Third, what is striking about the assumptions underlying the EIDHR objectives is that their 
vision of civil society actors implicitly assumes that CSOs have the courage to actively 
challenge excessive state controls over society. Civil society is, arguably, conceived as 
something of a check against the state, and the individuals and organisations funded are those 
who are willing to enter the fray in challenging the state when it infringes on freedoms. 
Governments are interestingly perceived as a potential threat to the kind to active democratic 
civil society support that EIDHR envisages: this emphasis can be seen in EIDHR’s (EC, 
2006: 2) insistence that it offers ‘independence of action’, allowing assistance ‘without the 
need for government consent’. This view of civil society conforms to a fairly classical liberal 
notion of civil society (see e.g. Baker, 2002). Unlike in participatory or social democratic 
traditions where the aim of civil society is the fostering of group or national solidarity or 
collective learning, the focus of the EIDHR’s vision is on rights-defending liberal 
democracy-enhancing pluralist civil society.  
 
Fourth, aligned to the assumptions of civil society as a ‘check on state’ and as ‘effective 
producer of change’ is the notion that civil society is and should be autonomous, active and 
‘entrepreneurial’ in defence of freedoms. According to the Foucauldian logic, a key aspect of 
neoliberal governmentality is the fostering of entrepreneurial actors who not only think of 
themselves as autonomous actors, but who are aware of the capacities and skills that they 
have to ‘sell’ in societal context. Such individuals have already been encouraged by the EU in 
the context of its own citizenship agenda in the Lisbon agreement. At the heart of new 
citizenship model of the EU (Hagel, 2009: 115-116) is a citizen as self-reliant, risk-taker, 
entrepreneur and innovator, who has no need for social welfare structures or state support and 
who take responsibility for finding and adapting themselves to the market opportunities. It is, 
interestingly, precisely these sorts of individuals that seem to stand at the heart of the kind of 
vision of civil society that the EIDHR too sets out in its objectives. Because elites can remain 
‘unaccountable and unresponsive to citizens’ expectations’, active, rights-informed, 
competitively motivated, modernising, prosperity-seeking individuals – and by extension 
civil society organisations – are needed (EC, 2006).  
 
Indeed, rather interestingly, not only are individuals to be entrepreneurial and responsibility 
taking but so are civil society organisations. They must take active responsibilities in 
competing for funding, applying for funding and in initiating activities. Indeed, interestingly, 
CSOs are at times conceptualised as ‘lobby groups’, much like those lobbying for more 
economically driven interests within pluralist ‘market democracies’ (see e.g. the rise of the 
EDP, 2009). Arguably, the assumption is that the individual in the social sphere should act 
much like the individual in the market sphere: actively, constructive and entrepreneurially. 
She should transfer her wishes and interests through the civil society organisations, and these 
organisations should seek to compete with each other in order to lobby governmental and 
international programmes for funding. A competitive market logic requiring entrepreneurial 
actors is central to the logic of EIDHR democracy promotion: what arguably emerges then is 
a ‘liberal’ pluralist vision of civil society.  
 
However, fifth, and crucially, within the EIDHR civil society is not simply ‘let be’ (as within 
classical liberal pluralist vision); it is turned into an ‘active object of governance’ (Sending 
and Neumann, 2008). Since the EIDHR, and EuropeAid more generally, envision the role of 
a ‘partner’ for the civil society organisations, it is not simply enough to let civil society to 
grow on its own accord. It must be facilitated in its ability to take on the functions envisaged 
for it. Since the CSOs are to take on the role of delivering and managing aid – they are to 
‘own’ and ‘take responsibility’ for the projects and their governance – their capacity to be 
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such kind of democratising actors must be facilitated. The EU audits the projects it funds and 
sets the framework for their functioning (see next section), yet the EIDHR devolves powers 
to the civil society organisations to manage and implement these, and indeed, expects that 
with correct facilitation the CSOs will embrace these tasks. ‘[T]hrough [partnership] 
contracts… recipients are enlisted as active agents of their own reform according to accepted 
and agreed standards’ (Abrahamsen, 2004: 1461). 
 
Sixth, it is important to note that not just a specific set of understandings about the individual 
or civil society that emerge from EIDHR objectives, a specific vision of the democratic state 
also emerges, and crucially one that is distanced from classical liberal or social welfare states. 
A privatised service provision role is envisaged for the NGOs and CSOs within states. A 
conscious effort has been made to widen the scope of EIDHR’s funding in recent years as 
there has been a shift in EIDHR II towards facilitation of organisations the aims of which 
may not be directly focused on democracy or human rights issues, nor ‘advocacy’ and 
‘watchdog’ functions as traditionally conceived (Youngs, 2008: 165). Wider issue areas, it is 
acknowledged, can also indirectly link up with the overall aims of the EIDHR. Indeed, just as 
aid policies more generally have come to see ‘service provision’ as a crucial aspect of civil 
society functions (EC, 2010: 19), so has the EIDHR moved to support of service provision, 
rather than mere ‘advocacy’ projects.  These are considered crucial in ‘capacity building’ of 
societies, civil society organisations and individuals. It follows that increasing attention is 
paid to the facilitation of capacity building for vulnerable groups of people: women, children, 
the disabled, the poor, the working class (EC, 2006: 8).  
 
However, it is interesting to note that with the widening scope of activities, civil society 
actors are expected to achieve more in the target states, and, conversely, the state rather less. 
Arguably, implied in the EIDHR’s approach is the assumption that civil society groups are to 
actively encourage people to become full participating democratic citizens. This entails that 
the civil society comes to take on a role as ‘service providers’ for weak groups of people, thus 
removing the responsibility of the EU or the state from such service provision. Indeed, it is 
envisaged that non-state actors start taking on public roles ‘as if these services had been 
‘contracted out’ by the government (EC, 2004: 9). As the state’s role is seen as diminished, 
paradoxically state level democratic processes are also sidestepped, while the ‘third sector’ 
becomes a ‘service provider’ that fills the gap that emerges in the traditional role of the social 
democratic state (see also Leubolt, Novy and Beinstein, 2008 for a fascinating discussion). 
As a result, far from moving socio-economic governance of the system towards more social 
democratic directions, which is what one might assume by observing a plurality of social 
welfare based organisations being supported by the EIDHR, the direction of action could be 
argued to be quite the opposite: the encouragement of the minimisation of the role of the 
state, and social democratic consensus and structures of facilitation within it.  
 
This initial analysis of the hidden assumptions embedded in EIDHR’s strategy documents 
reveals some interesting insights as to EIDHR’s understandings and expectations with regard 
to target populations, civil society and the state. But are they put into practice in EIDHR’s 
actual funding and management systems?  
 
 
Calling forth the ‘civil society’: calls for proposals 
 
The key tool of the EIDHR in terms of provision of democracy support is through the calls 
for proposals: these are now ‘the general rule when dealing with non-state actors’ within EU 
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development policy more generally (EC, 2004: 17). Calls for proposals are seen as a non-
intrusive and fruitfully ‘passive’ and ‘democratic’ method of encouraging democracy from 
below because they facilitate the local ownership of projects on the ground and thus highlight 
the importance of partner-led, civil-society-directed democracy promotion efforts. As is noted 
by the EC, with the calls for proposals ‘the responsibility for identifying, formulating and 
implementing projects is…passed on to those who apply for co-funding’ (EC, 2004: 17). But 
are the CfPs unstructured opportunities for the exercise of free will by civil society actors, or 
are there governmentality techniques involved in the way they are framed? 
 
First, it has to be noted that the way in which the expectations for the calls for proposals are 
structured are specified by the EU. This inevitably introduces an element of disciplinary 
power to the EIDHR’s democracy promotion. Despite the moves to introduce greater 
flexibility within the calls for proposals, with regard to the eligibility criteria, length and 
objectives of the projects, as well as the legitimate partners and financial structuring of the 
projects (Rihackova, 2008), the framework for projects under the auspices of the EIDHR are 
defined by the EU. Standard formats for CfPs are used by the EIDHR and by the country 
delegations that introduce CfPs on EC’s behalf.  
 
This is understandable, of course, for the EIDHR distributes public money, and it would be 
dangerous not to insist on structures of oversight over how aid is spent. Yet, the level and 
nature of the managerial set up is also somewhat paradoxical given the claims to encourage 
ownership of projects by local organisations. It is quite clear that limited room exists for 
CSOs to set up their programmes and projects outside the specified criteria set out in the calls 
for proposals. If an organisation lacks the financial structures to manage the EU money or 
refuses to engage with the expected practices of management, it will not receive funding. It is 
then important to note that not all organisations are embraced by the EIDHR; and that 
preference is (has to be) given to those who are willing to (and in many cases, accustomed to) 
EU management practices set out in the calls for proposals. The calls for proposals, one could 
argue, are in and of themselves a disciplinary method of filtering out trustworthy participants 
in creation of democratic realities in target states. 
 
There is another aspect that is interesting about the calls for proposals, however, and one that 
is reliant on a more neoliberal governmentality form of ‘self-regulation’ (not the fairly 
standard mode of bureaucratic regulation above). Calls for proposals tend to be fairly open in 
nature, relating for example, to human rights support actions in target states, yet hidden 
within them are important forms of linguistic and ideational regulations that the applicants 
must internalise, or at least seemingly internalise in their applications for funding. Thus, the 
EU’s (often vague) language of rights and democracy is expected to be used in the 
applications; as is the language of civil society effectiveness. It would seem inconceivable for 
a CSO to admit that it does not aim for rights or democracy promotion in the liberal 
democratic vein envisaged (broadly) by the EU, that it does not seek to support citizen 
activities that encourage critical engagement with the state and rights frameworks within 
them, or that it did not believe in the effectivity of its activities in bringing democratic change 
about. It is no surprise then that such language is characteristic of the self-descriptions of the 
funded projects (EC, 2009).  
 
Another crucial aspect of the language to be adopted by CSOs centres around the language of 
trustworthy ‘responsible’ project management. In line with EU’s calls for proposals, the 
project proposals must conform to expectations of responsible management, cost-
effectiveness, and observable measurability of projects. Effectiveness is promised and 
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measured for the EIDHR, as the projects become self-regulating and self-managing for the 
EIDHR. This self-management and regulation is re-enforced by another aspect in the EIDHR 
funding calls – the need to accept and conform to structures of competition. Civil society 
organisations are to understand, precisely because of the calls for proposals, that they 
compete with other actors and that they have to, in order to obtain funding, compete against 
the other applicants. Competitive calls demand precision and re-enforced self-regulation by 
CSOs.  
 
This is not all, however, for it could also be argued that the partial (50%) nature of the 
funding given to CSOs reinforces even further the self-regulation of CSOs as competitive 
actors in their societies. This partial funding is part of the EIDHR’s incentive-led approach: 
EIDHR seeks to incentivise CSOs so as to become actively competitive actors. In not funding 
them at 100% levels not only are relations of dependence to the EU avoided, but also, from a 
Foucauldian perspective, the civil society organisations are forced to remain attuned to and 
competitive and attractive in the civil  and market society contexts that they seek to influence. 
Civil society organisations compete, and should compete, in the funding market in a holistic 
and general way; they should not developed direct ‘monopolistic’ relations of dependence to 
specific funders. Civil society organisations should act as competitive agents – as homo 
oeconomicus – in their political, cultural and economic scene. 
 
 
Management tools as a governmentality technique 
 
Besides ticking the boxes with regard to the proposals, what is also necessary is that projects 
commit to management practices required by the EU. One of the key criticisms that EIDHR I 
faced was that it was overly rigid in its management structures (see e.g. Crawford, 2002, 
2003a; 2003b). As a result EIDHR II has placed great emphasis on allowing flexibility of 
action and, especially, move towards more local ownership of project management. This 
reflects a wider move within the EU’s development aid policy, and indeed aid effectiveness 
debates more generally, towards a participatory approach to development, which highlights 
the movement away from states towards civil society organisations as real partners in 
development (see for example, the EC’s Structured Dialogue initiative, EC, 2010). But what 
does this movement towards flexible and devolved approach to management mean within the 
Foucauldian framework? Interestingly, it implies not the attenuation, but rather a shift in the 
governmental techniques involved, and a shift that has been noted in development aid circles 
more widely (Duffield, 2007; Gould, 2008; Abrahamsen, 2004; see also Ferguson, 1994).  
 
EIDHR II, as a reflection of the paradigm shift towards ownership in aid policy (EC, 2010: 
16), has given more and more powers for local delegations and committees to make decisions 
on funding. It also makes it clear that the CSOs take responsibility for their own 
management. Yet, it is striking that despite the devolution of powers on decision-making to 
local EC/EIDHR delegations, the structure of the management and requirements for the 
acquisition of grants remain standardised. Every call for proposal includes the same, rather 
demanding requirements, for the CSOs to meet in managing projects. Crucially, besides the 
financial management tools, the logical framework (log frame) project management system 
remains a general requirement for all projects. Moreover, within EuropeAid, a clear set of 
guidelines are provided for the project management cycle, and criteria to be used in 
interpreting EIDHR objectives (Channel Research, 2005). Clear cut objectively and 
observably identifiable effectiveness of grant projects is required to be proven in the 
management of the projects. 
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These management tools, while eminently understandable within publically funded schemes, 
are not inconsequential from the point of view of governmentality. From a Foucauldian 
perspective the EIDHR management framework is interesting not just because it is rigorous 
and standardised and hence reveals  disciplinary control over actors, but also because of the 
kind of self-regulating ‘aesthetic’ it creates as to what is required from civil society actors 
and how they should behave as civil society actors (Gould: 2008).  
 
The log frame provides an interesting example of the hidden governmentality within the 
EIDHR’s standardised management tools. The log frame management framework seeks to set 
out a clear and comprehensive logic for development aid, action and management, by setting 
out a set of objectives and expected results against which activities and hence funding can be 
measured. Its core assumption is that clearly defined criteria can be produced even for the 
most ambitious and vague set of objectives, and that it is the role of CSOs to think ahead of 
time about how they isolate causal effects within their areas of operation so as to be able to 
clearly measure the effects of their own projects. Attached to the log frame are a set of 
documents that specify what kinds of indicators the projects should use to approximate the 
effects of their actions vis a vis the general objectives of the EIDHR (Channel Research, 
2005). 
 
The log frame is an interesting management tool for it is, while partly disciplinary, largely 
reliant on CSOs themselves identifying the core parameters and limits of their projects, as 
well as defining the scope of their actions. It is not the EU that is required to know the ins and 
outs of the individual societies but the CSOs: they become the knowledge producers on the 
local context, as well as project interveners in that context through isolation of causal 
influences and construction of clear measurable manipulations of target environment through 
project activities.  
 
At the same time, the EU remains in control of the requirement that log frame must be used, 
and forces the CSOs to not only manipulate their environment in clearly defined, variable-
aware ways, where specific actions and effects are sought (while holistic aims or non-activity 
centred objectives are set to one side). Simultaneously, the log frame forces the CSOs to 
focus on activity based projects, with clearly observable effects and isolatable, measurable 
contexts. It is not any kind of activity or project that is funded by the EU, but specific activity 
related projects, defined and measured in relation to a defined set of legitimate kind of 
criteria. 
 
The log frame framework is an important tool of development aid and remains extremely 
popular among many actors. Yet it is not a neutral tool, Foucauldians remind us: it facilitates 
particular kinds of activities and disciplines the kinds of projects that can be envisaged 
(Gould, 2008). Crucially, the log frame is, one could argue, a central component of the 
development aesthetic which increasingly guides development aid: 
 
[I]t is… considerations of style which determine success in securing a project and thus 
ensuring the availability of assets for elite accumulation. These include meticulous audits 
and a complex array of formalized reporting procedures: stakeholder analysis, project 
documents based on logical framework analysis, standardized monitoring and evaluation 
reports, financial summaries based on strictly prescribed formats. Indeed, the 
internalisation of a rigorously formalized aesthetic for the production of such documents 
is considered a prime indicator of improved capacity….Because ‘aesthetic’ discipline is 
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about form as against content, there is little overt conflict between the rhetoric of 
‘empowerment’ and demands to conform to externally imposed criteria of ‘style’ 
(including, standards of leadership and management structure). This form of disciplinary 
power can comfortably co-exist within a patron organization alongside an empowering 
self-image and the rhetoric of partnership (Gould, 2008: 103). 
 
The management structures of the EIDHR thus not only reinforce the assumptions of civil 
society actors as effective, empowered and empowering, change inducing actors, but also as 
active owners and managers of their own democratic development, albeit within the confines 
of pre-defined notions of what should constitute, broadly, the scope of democratising actions 
and trustworthy democratising actors. An auditable measure-driven organisation is a 
trustworthy democracy-enhancing organisation. Capacity to democratise becomes equated 
with capacity to obtain and manage funding. 
 
 
Non-ideological but neoliberal democracy promotion? 
 
The EU has explicitly shied away from proposing a clear-cut and specific democracy 
promotion strategy for its neighbourhood or its near abroad. Instead, a variety of different 
kinds of programmes and initiatives are set up that reflect a complex set of negotiations 
between the Commission (and its DGs, notably DGs EXREL and DG DEV), the members of 
the management committee for the policy area (involving representatives of member states), 
European Parliament’s Democratic Caucus and Human Rights committee, and a selection of 
civil society and NGO actors (see e.g. Rihackova, 2008). The result is a ‘compromise’ 
approach to democracy promotion and one that is, as a result, explicitly evasive of specific 
political or ideological leanings or stances. There is in the EIDHR too a depoliticising 
tendency: vague liberal democratic language is used but no specific political leanings or 
interpretations are adopted with regard to how human rights or democracy should be 
conceived and what kind of actors should be funded. Although ‘governance aid is now 
embedded in European aid bureaucracy…[it is] not readily guided by political direction’ 
(Youngs, 2008: 168).  
 
What does this mean for democracy promotion of the EIDHR? That all kinds of 
democratising political actors are funded? Or simply that the question of politics is sidelined, 
and that as a result, inadvertently, some kinds of actors are funded while others are not? It 
seems that the latter is the case, and, importantly, that the Foucauldian perspective can help 
us shed new light on the workings of the seemingly non-ideological tendencies in EU 
democracy promotion. It allows us to understand that despite the non-ideological background 
discourse, the EIDHR’s policies and practices, may still amount to, if not an explicit 
ideology, a set of ‘rationalities’, which constrain and dispose actors funded in specific ways.  
 
But what kind of actors are funded and how limiting is the scope defined for them? Without 
conducting individual analyses of civil society organisations it is difficult to answer this 
question fully. Yet, some concluding reflections can be made. 
 
First, the actors that are funded are those that accept that democratisation is a progressive 
process, and an inevitable process, for modernising actors. Non-democratic or non-
democratising civil society forces have no room within the EIDHR’s funding streams. It is 
also expected that actors accept, as the EIDHR does, that democratisation enforces the wealth 
and prosperity of the target countries and their populations. The EIDHR’s Strategy Document 
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(EC, 2006) is replete with unstated assumptions to the effect that democratisation is 
something to be pursued for modernising progressive states, individuals and civil society 
organisations, and, indeed, rationally efficient and prosperity-enhancing for the target 
countries. To be, or to aim to be, democratic is what is deemed as ‘rational’, and this 
rationality is arguably tied to a wider developmental rationality. 
 
The above analysis would also suggest that liberal sets of assumptions underlie the practices 
of the EIDHR. It is broadly a liberal pluralist set of assumptions that are made about civil 
society, as a check on state and as site for critical activity by autonomous actors. Yet, there is 
a curious aspect to this liberalism as we have seen. First, as we have noted, it is curious in the 
sense that it is seemingly non-ideological. Very rarely does the EIDHR openly acknowledge 
its liberal principles: they are instead simply assumed as background assumptions. Second, 
and to which I will now turn, this liberal rationality, it would seem, is far more active and 
interventionist in nature than one would expect with classical liberal ideals in mind. 
 
As we have seen, the rationality that emerges in the EIDHR implies that democracy is 
something to be facilitated through active intervention. The EIDHR envisages an active 
interference in the target countries in order to bring about the right kind of conduct and 
freedoms within them. In this sense, the EIDHR is in Foucauldian terms, precisely about the 
‘conduct of conduct’. Its calls for proposals and management tools envisage particular kinds 
of actors, ones that with the right active incentivisation will become advocates of the right 
kinds of freedoms and active self-regulators and managers of their own projects and 
activities. 
 
Furthermore, it is notable that a neoliberal set of rationalities seem to emerge from the 
documents and management structures. While it is not openly specified what individuals or 
societies should look like, from the practices of the EIDHR emerges a vision of 
entrepreneurial individuals and civil society organisations that actively control and delimit 
the state, that compete with each other for resources, and that market themselves and their 
solutions and services to productive citizens. Even if seemingly social democratic civil 
society organisations are funded, the logic is that civil society organisations should take on 
the role of service provision from the state, or facilitate its functioning through their 
‘privatised’ capacity-building.  
 
As a result an implicit market model of democracy (see e.g. McPherson, 1977) emerges from 
the practices of EIDHR – both in terms of the dominant conception of what democratic civil 
society and state should look like in target states (liberal entrepreneurial) and in terms of what 
‘democratic’ democracy promotion involves (competition for funds). Although the EIDHR 
takes no sides in the ideological debate about what kind of democracy should be promoted, it 
seems that implicitly its objectives, CfPs and management structures create an environment 
where a specific model is encouraged. Even if lip-service may be paid to social democracy or 
participatory democracy, or to political pluralism, dispositions that seem to contradict the 
core elements of these models (which emphasise democratic control of markets, strong 
regulating state, solidarity-enhancing and democratically functioning civil society of 
voluntary actors), seem to nevertheless be implied. This, arguably, creates some limits to the 
scope of democratic alternatives that are funded and assisted by the EU. Not all organisations 
stand in good stead to receive EU funding, such as: radical democratic organisations with 
‘overly’ ambitious structural or non-activity based objectives; local organisations without an 
international framework or reach; non-competitive organisations or organisations without 
ability (or will) to compete for external funding; non-activity-based (and hence measurement-
 19 
evasive) organisations; or non-professionalised non-managerially inclined organisations. The 
governmentality logics in the EIDHR create not only limitations to the kinds of ‘pluralistic’ 
alternatives the EU can fund, but also, the system itself creates self-regulating limitations as 
to how CSOs (even when radical, socialist or social democratic in nature) should conceive of 
themselves and their role in their democratic societies. 
 
 
Conclusions: Governmentality in and through EIDHR 
 
Paradoxically, the people responsible for producing and reproducing development 
rhetoric – policy-makers, managers and consultants – are themselves largely captive to 
their own words and concepts (Gould, 2008, 2). 
 
The EU democracy promotion framework provides a particular set of tools, and truths, for the 
democratic masses of the 21
st
 century. As admirable as democracy promotion activities can 
be at their best, it is important to note that they are not power-free. Indeed, we have seen here 
that even despite the move towards civil society support and local ownership in democracy 
promotion, it can imply the prioritisation of some democratic visions over others. Democracy 
promotion may then shape the nature of target states and publics in deep and thorough-going 
ways, even if it adopts non-ideological and technical framework and language and devolves 
powers to civil society actors. This paper, employing the Foucauldian perspective, has 
suggested that the rationalities and techniques that emerge from objectives and practices of 
the EIDHR are not necessarily intentionally applied by bureaucrats or desk officers for 
specific strategic ends. Yet, nevertheless, rationalities may emerge, and as a result, not all 
kinds of democratic actors or economic visions stand in equal stead to be facilitated by the 
EU democracy promotion programmes. Many voluntary organisations, small-scale 
organisations, non-funded organisations, non-professionalised organisations, anti-EU, or non-
internationalised organisations do not feature within the purview of the EIDHR. And this is 
not all for, simultaneously, the CSOs that are funded are disposed in specific ways by the 
funder. 
 
The EU promotes an active and productive civil society. However, it also promotes rights-
based CSOs and ones that will take on the responsibility to keep the state in check. At the 
same time it promotes a civil society that will take on the functions of the state, when needed, 
and a civil society within which homo oeconomicus can productively function. It encourages 
a civil society takes on the role of ‘service’ provision in areas where it is more beneficial for 
it to do so than for the state. And moreover, the EIDHR promotes a civil society of this kind, 
not by ‘letting it be’ but by actively bringing it about – interventions are necessary for the 
creation of the right kind of ‘freedoms’. It encourages civil society organisations to realise 
themselves as entrepreneurial actors competing for funding and ‘pitching’ themselves as 
rational and progressive actors for change. At the same time, the project management tools of 
the EIDHR ensure that organisations and individuals within them regulate themselves to act 
in ways that are decentred, yet precise, action-centred, cost-effective and objectively 
measurable. In so doing, the EIDHR seek to manage the publics of the target states, pushing 
them in the direction of the right kind of freedoms and away from the wrong kind of civil 
society activities.  
 
But how successful are such efforts? This is an important question, but also one that is very 
difficult to answer. It is difficult to answer for two reasons. First, it is difficult to obtain proof 
of the success or otherwise of governmentality techniques and rationalities. From a cursory 
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survey it seems to be the case that the language and hence the underlying assumptions of the 
neoliberal rationalities and techniques pointed to here do get adopted by many civil society 
organisations that work with the EIDHR (EC, 2009). It may of course be the case that the 
CSOs may merely ‘play’ the funder, and that governmentality does not then have direct effect 
in governing the CSO actors. Yet, it is reasonable to assume that language itself can play, 
even unconsciously, an important role in shaping and guiding the very beliefs of 
organisations themselves. Indeed, it is because of the power of language to shape actions that 
the EU has from the start attached great importance to language of democracy and human 
rights in its co-operation with target states (see e.g. EC, 1995). Language is rarely in long-
term merely rhetorical but it comes to guide ideational understandings of the world. Thus, 
even if CSOs themselves treat EIDHR funding requirements and aesthetics strategically, they 
are likely to be shaped by them. Curiously that is precisely the way in which governmentality 
techniques tend to function: without the full knowledge or awareness of their implicit effects 
on those to whom they are applied. Obtaining clear evidence of success then is deeply 
problematic, for not only is it difficult to access CSOs intentions, but further they may not 
provide us with trustworthy answers.  
 
Second, we must also note that, as Foucault himself always powerfully asserted, 
governmentality techniques and rationalities are never complete, nor should we expect them 
to be. They are logics, which can be and inevitably are, mediated when encountered in 
different contexts. They do not work as universal mechanistic ways but must be analysed in 
their complex societal and cultural contexts. Analyses that delve into the many contexts that 
mediate the EIDHR’s practices in different countries should be conducted to gain a better 
sense of how such logics are, in practice, mediated and shaped. We need to gain a better 
sense of the kind of effects governmentality has on CSOs, but also of the room for 
negotiation and resistance to these governmentality techniques within the EIDHR framework. 
 
But if we accept, on the basis of the initial and incomplete analysis advanced here, the role of 
governmentality techniques and rationalities pointed to, what does this mean for how we 
should approach and evaluate EU action in the area of democracy promotion? It by no means 
entails we need to do away with democracy promotion. Yet, it does raise for consideration 
five important points. 
 
First, it needs to be recognised that EU’s civil society support and local participation in 
democracy promotion may not be the golden goose that it seems to be for some. Despite 
emphasis on local ownership, this does not mean that local ownership is practiced 
unconstrained. As we have seen various forms of self-regulation and disciplining function in 
the EIDHR’s policies. As a result, the EIDHR does not support all kinds of civil society, nor 
necessarily ‘authentically’ grass-roots reflective civil society. 
 
Second, we need to be more finely attuned to the hidden politics, and hidden power politics 
of EU’s depoliticised democracy promotion system. Even in the absence of a clear cut and 
explicitly delineated ideology certain rationalities and assumptions, and power relationships 
or effects may emerge from practices. Thus, EU democracy promotion cannot be perceived 
as unbiased, non-ideological and non-interfering in the political and economic systems of 
states. It is, as is all democracy promotion, deeply political and economical facilitation of 
particular visions of good life, not all of them.  
 
Third, we need to recognise the possibility that hidden economic as well as political visions 
are implicit in democracy advocacy. The Foucauldian framework sensitises to understand that 
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even when economic rationalities are seemingly not present, they may be hidden deep within 
frameworks of though in relation to political and cultural activities. The civil society support 
through competitive funding calls for example is not a neutral non-economic exercise but 
about the facilitation of an image of homo oeconomicus within civil society. Socio-economic 
functions within states too may (inadvertently perhaps) be fragmented away from the state 
through civil society support.  
 
Fourth, the analysis here suggests that EU democracy promotion may be constrained in the 
extent to which it can take account of and promote ‘democratic dialogue’ about the meaning 
of democracy, a stated aim of some actors within the EU. Democratising democracy 
promotion (de Sousa Santos, 2005) and dialogue surrounding it may be a valuable end goal 
but we need to be reflective of what models of democracy are used to ‘democratise’ 
democracy promotion: a market model of democracy at the centre of the EIDHR is not 
arguably the model of democracy in mind of many political and social actors in target states 
and may in fact render it more rather than less difficult to bring about real democratic 
dialogue on democracy.  
 
Fifth, we need to recognise the effects of rationalities for debates on coherence within the EU 
framework. The EU has been struggling to render its democracy promotion, development and 
external aid policies coherent, while simultaneously devolving practices. This analysis 
reminds us that while search for coherence is made all the more challenging by pluralistic 
civil society support, simultaneously rationalities of certain kind can unite even the most 
seemingly disparate forms of democracy promotion practice. Coherence can be seen as both 
an elusive aim and paradoxically a hidden aspect of democracy promotion.  
 
Finally, the analysis here directs us to think critically about the nature and aims of democracy 
promotion. If there is indeed a hidden prioritisation of style over content, well-managed 
practice over substantive effects or implementation of strategic visions, this raises the 
question: ‘what is the role of democracy promotion within the EU?’. The Foucauldian 
analysis suggests the possibility that an important target of democracy promotion may in fact 
be its effects on legitimation of the EU as an actor and a particular kind of an actor, not 
necessarily simply its effects on the ground. Aims of democracy promotion may not be what 
they seem to be, and target of governmentality may be as much the internal constitution and 
‘actorship’ of the EU as the target states and populations. 
 
In sum, the Foucauldian perspective forces us to recognise that civil society democracy 
promotion is both an important and far less ‘soft’ and self-evidently benevolent process than 
is often recognised. This is an important insight, for it hastens us to consider a level of 
realism and humility when evaluating EU democracy promotion. We need to recognise not 
just the mistakes or programmatic problems of projects, but more deeply, their underlying 
conceptual underpinnings and conditions. In so doing, we are in a better position to recognise 
the politics of democracy promotion, and its economic visions, hidden deep within its 
presently technical and depoliticised discourse. 
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